The Great Emu War: An Unsuccessful Battle Against the Australian Bird Population

The Emu War, also called the Great Emu War, was a wildlife military operation that took place in the later half of 1932 in Australia, primarily as an attempt to resolve concern over the number of wild emus in the Western Australian district of Campion. Although it eventually bore a tentative degree of success, it was generally regarded as an embarrassment for everyone involved.

The conflict began in the aftermath of World War I, where a large number of discharged war veterans were given land in Western Australia by the government, predominantly in agriculturally marginal areas, and were encouraged to take up farming. However, despite promises by the government, recommendations were largely unsuccessful and subsidies were generally undelivered. Wheat prices continued to fall, prompting farmers to refuse the delivery of wheat in the future. This was intensified by the Great Depression, and thoroughly worsened by the bizarre arrival of at least 20,000 emus to the already-miserable region.

Emus were in a regular habit of migrating after their breeding season, taking off from inland regions and heading to the coast. Now, they were drawn to Western Australia, where the livestock of veteran farmers required an increased availability of cleared land and additional water supplies. This made the region immensely cultivated and appealing, and emus began arriving there en masse. In particular, they forayed into farm territory, particularly the marginal lands around Walgoolan and Chandler. This had devastating effects: they consumed crops, spoiled harvests, and left enormous gaps in fences where rabbits and other small animals could enter and cause further problems.

The furious farmers sent a deputation of ex-soldiers to meet Sir George Pearce, the Minister of Defence, requesting the deployment of machine guns to rid themselves of the problem. Pearce agreed on the condition that the guns would be used by actual military personnel, financed by the Western Australian government. This agreement was mainly because he believed the birds would make good target practice, and that it would be excellent propaganda if the government were seen helping farmers, particularly since they were in the middle of a brewing secession movement.

This “war” was led by the command of Major Gwynydd Purves Wynne-Aubrey Meredith, who led soldiers armed with two Lewis guns and around 10,000 rounds of ammunition. While the operation was set to begin in October 1932, it was briefly delayed due to unexpected rainfall; it began in full-swing by 2 November. The troops travelled to Campion, sighting around 50 emus, but their volley from the machine guns was utterly useless. In the following days, Meredith tried to move south, where the emus were reportedly tamer; however, it only produced minimal results.

What they soon realised was that the emus had developed a strategy of their own. The birds split into smaller groups, making it difficult to target them collectively. Further, they apprehended that “each pack seems to have its own leader now”, standing six feet high and warning its mates of the army’s approach. While both the army and local settlers tried to herd the emus into an ambush, the birds proved to be too clever for them.

Thus, by 8 November (six days after the engagement began), 2,500 rounds of ammunition had been fired, and the number of killed emus only ranged from 50 to 500. This was a humiliating failure, and featured deeply negatively in local media, with the government portrayed as a laughingstock. On 8 November, the Australian House of Representatives discussed the operation, and Pearce withdrew all military personnel. The first strike was finished, and the emus had emerged triumphant.

However, to the despair of the farmers, emu attacks intensified, probably because the hot weather and drought conditions lured the birds into their farms in the thousands. This time, the Premier of Western Australia, James Mitchell, lent support to the renewal of military assistance. By 12 November, the Minister of Defence had approved a recommencement of military efforts, and defended his decision in the Senate. Due to a lack of experienced machine gunners in the district, Meredith was once again placed in command.

The military took to the field on 13 November 1932, and found a surprising degree of success within the first two days, with around 40 emus killed. By 2 December, the soldiers succeeded in killing approximately 100 emus per week. In Meredith’s report, he claimed 986 kills with around 9,860 rounds, with an additional 2,500 wounded birds who died as a result of their injuries. The second attempt arguably saved what remained of the wheat, and Meredith was recalled on 10 December.

However, this success was only achieved by an exact ratio of 10:1 of bullets to dead emus, making the entire affair deeply embarrassing to the government. Despite farmers requesting military assistance in 1934, 1943, and 1948, they were turned down each time, as the government refused to suffer a repeat of their previous humiliation. Although exclusion barrier fencing soon became a popular method of keeping emus out of harvest areas, and a new bounty system was similarly effective, it is safe to say that the emus won the Great Emu War merely by outlasting humans. Meredith himself remarked that: “If we had a military division with the bullet-carrying capacity of these birds, it would face any army in the world”.